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Mereological relations such as part-of and its inverse has-part are fundamental to the description of the structure of living organisms.
Whereas classical mereology focuses on individual entities, mereological relations in biomedical ontologies are generally asserted between
classes of individuals. In general, this practice leaves some basic issues unanswered: type constraints of mereological relations, e.g., con-
cerning artifacts and biological entities, the relation between parthood and time, inferred parts and wholes as well as a delimitation of
parthood against spatial inclusion. Furthermore, mereological relations can be asserted not only between physical objects but also
between biological processes and medical procedures. We analyze these ambiguities and make suggestions for a standardization of mere-
ological relations in biomedical ontologies.
 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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It is widely recognized that the construction of biomed-
ical ontologies should obey formal ontological criteria, a
necessary condition for interoperability between human
and electronic agents. Beside is-a, the class subsumption
relation, the mereological relations part-of and its inverse
has-part play a pivotal role in all ontologies which describe
the structure of biological organisms and their constituents.
A wide variety of partonomies are present in the Founda-
tional Model of Anatomy (FMA) [1,2], the NCI thesaurus
[3], the anatomy schemata of the GALEN CORE model
[4], the SNOMED CT [5] anatomy branch, the Gene
Ontology [6], and in the diverse ontologies of the Open Bio-
medical Ontologies (OBO) platform [7]. Several authors [8–
10] grant the relation part-of the status of a foundational
relation. This is supported by top-level ontologies such as
DOLCE [11], BFO [12], and GOL [13].1532-0464/$ - see front matter  2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2005.11.003
* Corresponding author. Fax: +49 761 203 6711.
E-mail address: stschulz@uni-freiburg.de (S. Schulz).It is critical to any eﬀort of ontology engineering in a
given domain that relations characterized as foundational
are formally grounded and robust with regard to individual
interpretations in order to prevent human-dependent
semantic bias. This requirement is roughly fulﬁlled for
the well-studied is-a relation [14]. However, it has been
shown that matters become more complicated when not
arbitrary classes but properties or universals and their
changes over time are considered [15–18].
In this paper, we concentrate on the mereological rela-
tions part-of and has-part. The work on these relations,
as far as their assertion between individual entities is con-
cerned, is extensive [19]. In biomedical ontologies, attempts
to provide formal foundations for mereological relations
are more recent [20,9,21,22]. Here, in contrast to standard
mereology, Part-Of and Has-Part denote relations between
classes (such as in Part-Of (Cell Nucleus, Cell)) and not
relations between individuals, and they consequently have
diﬀerent properties. Moreover, parthood relations between
classes are complex and go beyond what has been formal-
ized in standard mereology. Related ontological questions
that need to be answered prior to the construction of for-
Table 1







Susans life Susans body




Susans hip arthroplasty Susans left femur




1 In the context of this paper, the term universal can be considered
synonymous with the terms class, sort, and type; similarly, particular can
be considered synonymous with the terms instance, individual, and token,
thus bridging philosophical and computer science terminologies. The exact
meaning of these terms is still subject to controversy. We refrain from the
use of the term concept due to its multiple, partly contradictory senses.
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categories:
• Parthood between material and non-material entities: Are
left ventricles parts of hearts, and is the boundary of this
liver part of this liver?
• Parthood over time: Is a lost hair or a surgically removed
appendix still part of the body? Is a tissue sample in a
laboratory still part of the organism from which it was
taken?
• Parthood and spatial location: Are transplanted organs
part of the donor organism, the receptor organism, or
both? Is a given molecule part of the cell in which it is
located at a given moment? Is a tooth ﬁlling part of a
tooth?
• Parthood between occurrents: Is the suturing process
part of an appendectomy, or is the interphase part of
mitosis?
Obviously, such mereological puzzles are concerned with
basic classes of biological entities and are, hence, relevant
to medicine (e.g., transplanted organs, tissue samples,
and heart ventricles) as well as to cell and molecular
biology.
The formal treatment of mereological relations in bio-
medical ontologies is still insuﬃcient. We claim that the
speciﬁc aspects of partonomic bio-medical structures point-
ed out above need to be made more explicit. Otherwise,
implicit assumptions in the diﬀerent uses of Part-Of and
Has-Part will vary among ontology engineers, users and
applications; unintended interpretations may occur, and,
as a consequence, system interoperability may be at risk.
In the following, we will ﬁrst clarify basic ontological
categories and then discuss mereological relations between
individuals and between classes of individuals. We will, fur-
thermore, address dimensions in which part-of related
ambiguities still exist: time-dependent parthood, parthood
vs. location, and parts of occurrents. Our proposals focus
on the practice of ontology engineering in the biomedical
domain. None of these proposals are entirely new. We,
therefore, refrain from formal deﬁnitions and restrict our-
selves to natural language. More detailed formalisms can
be found in the literature cited.
2. Basic assumptions and deﬁnitions
2.1. Four basic categories
The basis of our analysis is a four-category scheme
depicted in Table 1. Distinctions between biomedical enti-
ties can be drawn on the basis of their classiﬁcation either
as a universal or a particular and either as a continuant or
an occurrent. Most upper-level ontologies are concordant
in this respect. Particulars are the concrete and countable
entities in the world: this cell, my hand, my childhood, Sus-
ans left femur, Susans femur operation, etc. Universal
properties or universals are entities which are instantiatedby particulars, e.g., the universal Human Being is instanti-
ated by particulars like Susan, the universal Cell is instan-
tiated by this particular cell, the universal Femur is
instantiated by Susans left femur, the universal Hip Oste-
otomy is instantiated by Susans mothers hip osteotomy,
etc.1 We make the distinction between universals and par-
ticulars explicit by strict naming conventions: names of
universals use Upper Case initials while names of particu-
lars are written in lower case letters.
Particulars fall into two major categories: continuants
(also called endurants) and occurrents (also called perdu-
rants) [19]. This distinction is based on diﬀerent modes of
persistence through time and is also deeply rooted in com-
mon sense. Continuants persist through time by present in
their entirety at every point in time at which they exist.
For example, I am a continuant and I am wholly present
at every moment I exist. All the parts I have at a given
moment in time are present at this moment in time. Notice,
however, that I do not have the same parts at every
moment in time. For example, many cells of my gastroin-
testinal tract are exchanged within days. Organisms, popu-
lations, organs, cells, and molecules are also examples for
continuants, as well as material artifacts or geographic
entities.
Occurrents, on the other hand, are never present in their
entirety at a given instant. They have phases and temporal
parts which correspond to intervals through which they
perdure. For example, the process of you reading this
paper is not fully present at this moment. It might take
you another hour to complete this process. Other examples
for occurrents include my life, my childhood, and the pro-
cess of insulin synthesis that currently occurs in my body,
etc.
The distinction between continuants and occurrents at
the level of particulars is reﬂected at the level of universals
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continuants and occurrents, as instances. Consequently,
there are universals whose instances are continuants like
Heart, Human being, etc. and there are universals which
instances are occurrents like Human Life, Osteoarthrosis,
Hip Arthroplasty, Insulin Synthesis, Mitosis, etc. Most
upper level ontologies agree on these basic principles:
DOLCE [11], BFO [12], and GOL [13].
This distinction between continuants and occurrents is
also replicated at the mereological level. Parthood relations
hold among continuants (my heart is part of my body, this
cell nucleus is part of this cell) and among occurrents (my
childhood is part of my life) but not between continuants
and occurrents [19]. More speciﬁcally, among continuants,
parthood is time-dependent, i.e., a ternary relation: The
tooth was part of Susans body at time t1, i.e., part-of (Sus-
ans tooth, Susans body, t1). After the tooth was extracted
at time t2 it ceased to be part of Susans body, i.e., NOT
part-of (Susans tooth, Susan, t3).
Among occurrents, parthood is time independent, i.e., a
binary relation: My childhood is part of my life. This rela-
tion is ﬁxed and does not change. Therefore, it can truly be
asserted timeless.
2.2. Instances vs. classes
We reiterate that parthood relations represented in bio-
medical ontologies relate pairs of universals and not pairs
of particulars. This can easily be conﬁrmed by introspec-
tion into any biomedical vocabulary. Here, Part-Of
(Thumb, Hand) does not mean that an individual thumb
is part of an individual hand, but rather that the class of
thumbs and the class of hands stand in some special rela-
tionship which uniquely exists between universals. Such
class-level relations must be carefully kept apart (and dis-
tinguished by a diﬀerent notation) from instance-level rela-
tions such as part-of (my thumb, my hand), part-of (italy,
europe). We shall adopt the convention of referring to rela-
tions in which one or more instances are involved by means
of bold face expressions and lower case initials. Relations
involving only classes are picked out by Upper Case Initials
and Italic Fonts.
The distinction between class-level Part-Of and
instance-level part-of has been largely neglected in biomed-
ical vocabularies. One reason for this is the priority given
to a conceptual, thesaurus-like abstraction of word senses
over the representation of concrete entities in the world.
As much as this is suﬃcient and adequate for the purpose
of indexing and annotation of texts and has, up to now,
proved to be suﬃcient for many clinical coding purposes,
it deﬁnitely falls short when automated reasoning is
required.
As concept oriented vocabularies were increasingly
moving towards more precise semantics, conﬂicting inter-
pretations of mereological relations began to evolve: The
Gene Ontology [6], for instance, used to interpret Part-Of
as ‘‘can be a part of, not is always a part of [23]. Morerecently, this deﬁnition was changed to ‘‘The part-of rela-
tionship (. . .) is usually necessarily is-part [24].
In the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA) [25], on
the other hand, the class-level relation Part-Of (A, B) was
originally understood as a relation which was deﬁned as
follows [9]: the universal A is part of universal B if and only
if every instance of B has some instance of A as part and
every instance of A is part of some instance of B. Due to
the fact that there are various other class-based parthood
relations (to be explained below) the vocabulary of the
FMA will be extended to do justice to those relations
[22]. For the OBO ontologies, a consensus has recently
been reached which also takes the various class-based rela-
tions into account [10]. The diﬀerent readings of class-level
Part-Of can be summarized as follows:
1. All instances of A are part-of some instance of B. For
example, every instance of Human Female Reproductive
System is a part of some instance of Human Body.
2. All instances of B have some instance of A as a part. For
example, every instance of Heart has some instance(s) of
Cell as part(s).
3. All instances of A are part-of some instance of B and all
instances of B have some in stance of A as part. For
example, every instance of Human Nervous System is a
part of some instance of Human Body and every instance
of Human Body has some instance of Human Nervous
System as a part.
4. There is at least one instance of A which is part-of some
instance of B. For example, there are instances of Organ
which have Cardiac Muscle as part. But neither are all
instances of Cardiac Muscle part of an instance of
Organ, nor do all instances of Organ have instances of
Cardiac Muscle as part.
These regularities were formally captured in similar
ways by deﬁning several kinds of class-level Part-Of rela-
tions on the basis of instance-level parthood with diﬀerent
notations, for example in [26,9,8,22]. We summarize this in
Table 2. To this end, we introduce the ternary instantiation
relation Inst which relates an individual to a universal at
time t. The formal deﬁnitions based on time-dependent
instantiation and parthood are summarized in Table 2. In
addition, we subscribe to the following linguistic conven-
tion: ‘‘all Cells’’ means ‘‘all instances of the universal Cell.’’
The expression ‘‘a Cell’’ refers to some instance of the class
Cell.
• (1) is expressed by means of the class-level relation Part-
Of (A, B), e.g., Part-Of (Human Female Reproductive
System, Human Being);
• (2) is expressed by the class-level relation Has-Part (B,
A), e.g. Has-Part (Heart, Cell). Notice, however, that
Has-Part (Human Being, Human Female Reproductive
System) is not equivalent to Part-Of (Human Female
Reproductive System, Human Being) because not all
human beings have female reproductive systems. Also
Table 2
Class level mereological relations







Part-Of (A, B) "x,t: Inst (x,A, t)ﬁ $y: Inst (y,B, t)  p (x,y, t) A hmw B A part_ for B PP1 (A,B) A part_of B
Has-Part (B,A) "y, t: Inst (y,B, t)ﬁ $x: Inst (x,A, t)  p (x,y, t) A hmp1B B has_ part A PP2 (A,B) B has_ part A
Part-Of (A,B) 
Has-Part (B,A)
"x, t: (Inst (x,A, t)ﬁ $y: Inst (y,B, t)  p (x,y, t))
 "y, t: (Inst (y,B, t)ﬁ $x: Inst (x,A, t)  p (x,y, t))
A hmw B 
A hmp1B
A part_of B PP12 (A,B) A integral_ part_of B
Possible-Part-Of (A,B) $x,y, t: Inst (x,A, t)  Inst (y,B, t)  p (x,y, t) A how B
Notations from diﬀerent sources, p is an abbreviation for instance-level part-of.
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all cells are part of a heart. Class-level Has-Part is,
therefore, not the inverse relation of class-level Part-Of
as can be shown formally [26,22];
• (3) is expressed by the conjunction of (1) and (2), for the
sake of simplicity, instead of by means of the introduc-
tion of a new class-level relation, as suggested in
[9,22,10];
• (4) is expressed by the relation Possible-Part (A, B)
[27,28]. This is the weakest class-level relation and signi-
ﬁes nothing more than the following: There is at least
one instance of A which is part of an instance of B. It
holds between the classes Cardiac Muscle and Organ,
because there is some instance of cardiac muscle which
is part of an organ (e.g., in my heart). This explicit use
of Possible-Part (A, B) can be avoided by addressing
only the most speciﬁc classes so that the strict Part-Of
or Has-Part is fulﬁlled, e.g., Has-Part (Heart, Cardiac
Muscle), with Heart being a subclass of Organ.
All these relations have been introduced previously using
diﬀerent, even conﬂicting notations. A synopsis is present-
ed in Table 2.
The degree to which we can represent these relations in
a speciﬁc biomedical ontology may vary according to the
representation language and its underlying semantics. The
distinction between Part-Of (1) and Has-Part (2) is of
utmost importance and needs to be representable in any
formalism suitable for the representation of bio-medical
ontologies. (3) can, subsequently, always be expressed in
terms of (1) and (2). The relation Possible-Part-Of is dis-
pensable when we resort to a representation in description
logics. In contrast to database and frame systems,
description logics are based on the open world assump-
tion [29]. As a consequence, we need to explicitly rule
out classes for which there are no instances related by
part-of, such as the class pair Right Extremity/Left
Extremity [21]. Otherwise, any assertion of the type
part-of (a, b) is valid.
From the deﬁnitions in Table 2 it is obvious that in
order to understand class-level relations it is critical to
understand individual-level relations and the relation of
instantiation. In the next section, we will focus on
semantic aspects of the instance-level part-of relation
and give suggestions for its use in biomedical
ontologies.2.3. Basic properties of the instance level part-of relation
There is an impressive corpus of work published regard-
ing ontological, logical, cognitive, and linguistic properties
of mereological relations, cf. overviews in [19,31–35].
Throughout this paper, we restrict ourselves to a discussion
of part-of as related to biomedical reality and deliberately
ignore contributions which deal with the analysis of mere-
ological notions in the context of human language or cog-
nition [36–38]. The following points deserve our interest,
however, because they address ambiguities and therefore
require clariﬁcation, as justiﬁed above.
2.3.1. Proper vs. improper parts
2.3.1.1. Problem. Classical mereology generally builds upon
the instance-level relation part-of which is axiomatized as
transitive, antisymmetric, and reﬂexive. As an alternative
convention, Simons [19] proposed to take the irreﬂexive
relation proper-part-of as primitive and to deﬁne general
parthood in terms of proper parthood and identity. The
latter approach is more suitable when taking into account
the commonly accepted meaning of part in our domain,
which is generally assumed not to include identity, e.g., a
body is not seen as a kind of body part [39].
Transitivity and antisymmetry, however, are generally
accepted as properties in ontological (non-cognitive) for-
malizations of part-of and has-part. This does not necessar-
ily hold true for more speciﬁc parthood relations like the
relation immediate proper part of, which is not transitive.
Examples of these relations can be found in GALEN [40]
as well as in the FMA [25]. A discussion of these relations
is, however, beyond the scope of this paper (cf. [41,42] for
the discussion of non-transitive parthood relations).
For the sake of completeness, we do mention an unor-
thodox interpretation such as to include the notion of
proper overlap into parthood, e.g., part-of (myVagusNerve,
myThorax) or part-of (myEsophagus, myMediastinum) as
proposed by [43]. This interpretation—which is even sup-
ported by evidence gathered from medical textbooks—
may arise out of a confusion regarding the referent of
Vagus Nerve or Esophagus: instead of the entire anatomical
structure, something like ‘‘the whole structure or some of
its parts’’ may be referred to.
2.3.1.2. Suggestion. We propose to interpret part-of and






Fig. 1. External immaterial parts.
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no evidence that these relations have ever been used in the
‘‘improper’’ meaning in our domain. On this interpretation
part-of (x,x) is false.
From the irreﬂexivity of individual part-of does NOT
follow that class-level Part-Of is irreﬂexive [22]. Therefore,
one can generally admit the improper case, e.g., Has-Part
(Amount Of Matter, Amount Of Matter), even when deﬁn-
ing Has-Part in terms of the proper part-of relation as
introduced above. This means that any amount of matter
has a (smaller) amount of matter as part. With the weak
relation Possible-Part-Of there are plausible (and numer-
ous) cases for reﬂexivity, e.g., Possible-Part-Of (Biological
Structure, Biological Structure).
Furthermore, we clearly distinguish part-of from proper-
overlap. The latter relation holds whenever two objects
share a proper part.
2.3.2. Sortal restrictions
2.3.2.1. Problem. Some controversy exists about domain
and range restrictions for the part-of relation, especially
with regard to immaterial parts such as holes (cavities, pas-
sageways, intrusions, etc., cf. [44]) as well as boundaries
such as surfaces, lines, and points [45]. There is vast litera-
ture on boundaries discussing various kinds of boundaries:
bona ﬁde boundaries, which correspond to discontinuities
in reality (e.g., the boundary between my skin and the sur-
rounding air), and ﬁat boundaries which are boundaries
that are created by human demarcation and other cognitive
acts, e.g., the boundary between the left and the right part of
my body. See [46] for details. Unfortunately, in the litera-
ture there are diﬀerent opinions on whether a boundary is
a part of the object it delimits [47]. Is, for example, the sur-
face of my arm a part of my arm? In the FMA, for instance,
boundaries are not parts of the entities they bound.
Another controversial question is whether cavities are
parts of their hosts [48–50]. Is, for example, the cavity of
my stomach part of my stomach? Moreover, the distinction
whether hollow spaces at the surface of solid objects are
parts is essentially vague and depends on the demarcation
of these objects. A good example is the intestinal mucosa
(Fig. 1). We may argue that crypts are part of the mucosa,
but not the empty space between villi (intervillous space).
There is a smooth transition between both surface patterns,
so that any attempt of exact demarcation is arbitrary [51].
Finally, there are diﬀerent approaches regarding the sta-
tus of collectivities, i.e. pluralities of uniform objects.
Examples are presented by the red cells in my blood or
the collection of goblet cells in my stomach. The question
is whether the relation between one red blood cell and
the totality of red blood cells or between a bigger and a
smaller amount of red blood cells should be covered by
the general part-of relation [52,42].
2.3.2.2. Suggestion. We propose that (both ﬁat and bona
ﬁde) boundaries as well as empty spaces, subcollectivities,
and their individual elements can be within the domainand the range of part-of and has-part. The inner surface
of my stomach is, therefore, part-of my stomach as well
as its cavity. One distinct goblet cell in my stomach is
part-of the collection or plurality of goblet cells in my stom-
ach which is part-of my stomach.
Concerning sortal constraints, the following cases have to
be accounted for: an immaterial entity cannot have amateri-
al entity as part and the dimensionality of a part cannot be
higher than that of the object it is part-of. Inversely, the
dimensionality of a boundary part must be lower than
the one of the object it bounds. This rules out, for instance,
the common sense abstraction that the skin is a boundary
of a body: Though having only a small extent in the third
dimension, the skin is, nevertheless, a three-dimensional
object.
The dimensionality constraint also rules out vague
boundaries which are commonly regarded as body regions,
e.g., the boundary between the upper arm and the forearm,
since body regions are not lower-dimensional entities. We
suppose that vagueness is a feature of human concepts
which aﬀects ﬁat boundaries, i.e., boundaries that do not
correspond to discontinuities in reality. According to this
view, human concepts are often underdetermined in the
sense that they do not allow for the delineation of a single
ﬁat boundary. (Notice that this is a feature rather than a
shortcoming of concepts, since it allows for simplicity.
Imagine, for example, how complicated our concept of
forearm would have to be in order to exactly ﬁx the bound-
ary between upper arm and forearm). This indeterminacy
results in multiple, equally good boundary candidates,
which are located in body regions which are regarded as
(single) vague boundary. Consider, again, the boundary
between the upper arm and the forearm. It is clear that this
boundary is neither near the shoulder joint not near the
wrist. However, there are many equally passable boundary
candidates close to the elbow. Notice that every single one
of these boundary candidates is a perfectly crisp lower-di-
mensional boundary. They are all located in the pertinent
body region that is, by mistake, regarded as a vague
boundary. The same applies to cases such as the mucosa
example discussed above. In this paper, we do not elabo-
S. Schulz et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 350–361 355rate on the diﬃcult issue of vagueness. Cf. [53] for details.
Notice also that the distinction between bona ﬁde and ﬁat
boundaries is far from being simple and unproblematic
[51].
2.3.3. Mereological principles
2.3.3.1. Problem. Beyond the algebraic properties of part-of
and its inverse, formal mereology deals with additional prin-
ciples related to these relations. Here, we mention only the
weak supplementation principle (WSP), the proper part
principle (PPP), as well as the existence of atoms (entities
which do not have parts). Among others,WSP rules out that
there is an entity which has only one proper part. PPP states
that no twodistinct objects have exactly the same set of prop-
er parts [19].Questions havebeen raised concerning the latter
principle, a cornerstone of what is called extensionalmereol-
ogy [35]. For example, it is not diﬃcult to imagine that the
same set of proper parts can be arranged in quite diﬀerent
ways which results in distinct objects.
2.3.3.2. Suggestion. We are aware of the limited relevance
of these issues to the construction of biomedical ontologies.
The acceptance or rejection of WSP or PPP would be an
issue much better suited for reasoning about instances.
There are no straightforward correlates to these principles
when we consider parthood relations between classes. The
fact that a class in an ontology has only one direct has-part
descendant is not per se a contradiction of the WSP. Exam-
ples for this can be found whenever describing a class of
objects which are constituted by uniform compounds,
e.g., Has-Part (Leukocyte Collection, Leukocyte), which,
by no means, can be interpreted to signify an instance of
Leukocyte Collection has only one instance of Leukocyte
as part. We, therefore, do not argue for the introduction
of these principles on a class level.
Focusing on the instance-level relations, we suggest to
claim WSP and to subscribe to PPP for an atemporal view
on parthood: if two entities have exactly the same parts at a
given instant they are identical at this instant.
3. Parts and time in continuants
Biological continuants endure through time but may
undergo changes. In extreme cases, such as observed in
intestinal or endometrial mucosas, tissue structures are
completely exchanged within days. Growth phenomena
give rise to new entities, e.g., tumors, tumor vessels, embry-
os, and their parts. Biomedical ontologies should, there-
fore, pay tribute to these phenomena, as they make
universal assertions regarding classes of entities which are
mereologically variable [19], i.e., they are characterized
by continuously losing and gaining parts.
3.1. Problem
There are many concurrent theories about parts and
time [54]. The main reason of divergence is the discrepancyon whether continuant entities exist which are present with
all their (actual) parts at every time, e.g., an organism
which exists now as well as in other time instants (even hav-
ing lost some parts and gained others). The alternative view
is that there is only one such thing as the organisms life
and each stage in its life corresponds to a time-dependent
(temporal) part. For practical ontology engineering pur-
poses (which should be equally communicable and not
too far from common sense [19]) this latter perspective,
which expresses the whole physical reality in terms of
four-dimensional spatiotemporal objects, is problematic.
Hence, we do not challenge the categorial distinction
between continuants and occurrents introduced above.
More relevant for biomedical ontology engineering is
rather the inquiry regarding the objects which are not parts
of a biological continuant during their whole simultaneous
existence [55]. We call them temporary parts [19]. Is an
amputated toe, a blood sample, or a biopsy in a laboratory
still part of the organism they belonged to? As we included
collectivities of disconnected elements in our concept of
part, we could argue that these objects are still parts, albeit
disconnected ones. A hardly acceptable consequence of this
would be that the spatial extension of an organism would
then include every lost hair or skin particle scattered
around the organisms habitat.
3.2. Suggestion
According to [56], we introduce the ternary relation
part-of (a, b, t) which is interpreted as follows: a is part-
of b at instant t. An amount of blood, for example, is part
of an organism at t1 (when it is still in the organism), but it
is no longer part at the instant t2 when it is in the lab. This
means that we reject the position that it continues as a dis-
connected part of the organism even in the lab. In [57], the
instance-level relation temporary-part-of (a, b) is intro-
duced in order to describe that a at some instant in its life
is part of b, whereas permanent-part-of (a, b) means that a
is part of b at all instants of as lifecycle. The relation tem-
porary-part-of is, therefore, the most general relation.
Finally, we introduce historic-part-of which holds when-
ever temporary-part-of is true and permanent-part-of is
false. We do not consider future hypotheses, a may be per-
manent-part-of b now and historic-part-of b in the future.
Notice that the class-based relations Part-Of (A, B) and
Has-Part (A, B), as deﬁned above, are neutral with regard
to time.
Part-Of (A, B) expresses that at every time t every
instance of A at t is, at instant t, part-of some instance of
B. Has-Part (A, B) means that at every t every instance
of A at t has, at t, some instance of B as a part, cf. Table
2. For example, Has-Part (Liver, Hepatocyte) is a true
statement because at any time t any liver, which exists at
t has, at t certain hepatocytes as parts.
However, Part-Of (Hepatocyte, Liver) is not true (at
least in a domain of clinical reality), because a tissue sam-
ple taken during a liver puncture also contains hepatocytes,
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the notion of time independent parthood by introducing
the class-level relation Temp-Part-Of. Two classes A and
B are related by Temporary Parthood if and only if every
instance of A is part-of some B at at least one instant of
time. Has-Temp-Part is deﬁned analogously. To recapture
the liver example, Has-Temp-Part (Liver, Hepatocyte)
would hold true as well because Has-Part is the stronger
relation. Temp-Part-Of (Hepatocyte, Liver) would then
mean that every hepatocyte was once part of a liver (an
assertion challenged by recent advances in tissue engineer-
ing). Note that the class-level relations do not make any
statement about the permanence of a given part or whole
at an instance level. They only make a universal statement
about the class of wholes and parts, as the following exam-
ple shows: Has-Part (Piece of Metal, Amount of Electrons).
This solely means that every piece of metal contains some
amount of electrons but not that the same piece contains
exactly the same electrons over time.
4. Parts and location
Every continuant particular occupies a unique spatial
region at every moment in time at which it exists. Accord-
ing to [58], we introduce the partial function r which relates
a continuant a to the spatial region s that a occupies at
time-instant t: s = r (a, t). In other words, at time t the con-
tinuant a takes up the whole region s but does not extend
beyond it. r is a partial function since most continuants
do not exist at every time t.
We can subsequently deﬁne the relation located-in
between two continuant entities as follows [59,58]: Entity
a is located-in entity b at time t if and only if the region occu-
pied by a at t is part-of the region occupied by b at t. Accord-
ing to this deﬁnition, all parts of biological structures are
also located in their corresponding wholes. For example:
My mitral valve is part-of my heart. Therefore, it is also
located-in my heart. Notice, however, that not every entity
which is located-in a biological structure is also part-of that
structure. For example, a bolus of food is located-in my
stomach, i.e., at a given time the region of the bolus of food
is a part of the region of my stomach, but the bolus of food
is NOT part-ofmy stomach. We consequently introduce the
relation contained-in which holds if one entity is located-in
another one without being part-of it. For example, the bolus
of food is contained-in my stomach.
Corresponding to located-in and contained-in we also
introduce the inverse relations location-of and contains.
Additionally, we may introduce, analogously to the rela-
tions temporary-part-of and permanent-part-of the relations
temporarily-located-in and permanently-located-in as well as
temporarily-contained-in and permanently-contained-in.
4.1. Problem
Now, for some biological objects the following problem
arises: biological objects are involved in a constantexchange of matter with their environment, so that many
location relationships, e.g., the location of a given protein
molecule in a cell, are short-lived.
Moreover, the continuous nature of the processes of
matter exchange [60] suggests that it might be very diﬃcult
if not impossible to exactly specify the moment in time at
which parts of a given bolus of food (e.g., fat or carbohy-
drate molecules) cease to be merely contained in a given
anatomical structure but really become a part of it. More
speciﬁcally, when food decomposes into its components,
the portions of the substances in the lumen of the intestine
are contained therein but they are, nonetheless, not parts
thereof. Thus, we can ask at what stage of the process of
matter exchange they do become part-of the relevant cir-
cumcluding whole. For example, are the oligosaccharides
and lipids which are absorbed by the intestinal mucosa part
of it, even when they remain herein less than a millisecond?
4.2. Suggestion
We could propose that the notion of parthood, at least
when applied to biological continuants, intrinsically bears
some element of indeterminacy. If we make this claim it
would require to accept vagueness with regard to relations,
which is deﬁnitely not a well-grounded assumption.
Instead, we argue that in cases such as discussed above,
given the current knowledge about digestion processes and
the means available to observe them directly, it is relatively
easy to determine how entities are located relative to each
other but much more diﬃcult to gain knowledge about
whether or not some entity is part of another. Following
[61], we now discuss circumstances under which the fact
that the individual a is located-in the individual b is suﬃ-
cient to derive that a is a part-of b.
4.3. Artifacts and biological objects
For an object a to be part-of an object b, it must be
assured that a and b instantiate suitable classes. In addition
to the general sortality criteria outlined in Section 2.3.2, we
introduce two other sorts which are relevant to our
domain: artifacts (material objects of human creation)
and biological objects (genetically determined material
objects). Thus, if part-of (a, b) holds and b is a Biological
Object, we rule out that a is an Artifact (e.g., a heart pace-
maker, a bullet, a dental ﬁlling). An artifact located in a
biological object is, therefore, not part of it.
Furthermore, we state that any biological object a locat-
ed-in b is only contained-in b (i.e., not part-of b) if their
genetic origins are diﬀerent. Thus, applying this principle,
an embryo is not a part of the body of its mother. Similar-
ly, a bacterium which is located-in some tissue is contained-
in but not part-of that tissue. Notice, however, that from
the facts that a located-in b that a and b are biological enti-
ties with the same genetic origin it does NOT follow that a
part-of b. For example, a lymphocyte which is located-in a
piece of tissue may or may not be part-of this tissue.
S. Schulz et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 39 (2006) 350–361 357This principle cannot be applied to many biological mic-
romolecules such as sugars, lipids, or amino acids which
have no genetic origin. It also encounters problems if we
take into account that important cell organelles such as
chloroplasts or mitochondria (so-called endosymbionts)
have their own DNA which means that they are of diﬀerent
genetic origin as their host cells.
Finally, this principle can only be used to assert contain-
ment (by ruling out parthood) but it is not yet suﬃcient to
assert parthood.
4.4. Life cycle
As further parthood principle, we suggest: a is part-of b
in the case that a is located-in b and there is no point in time
at which a is not located-in b. In other words, permanently-
located-in would then imply permanent-part-of while
temporary location would not be suﬃcient for asserting
parthood. Note that this also covers those cases in which
a comes into existence later than b.
For example, my brain is, for the given reason, part of my
head and, for the same reason, a given cell membrane is part
of the cell it surrounds. This concept can also be applied to
pathological structures which originate within an organ,
such as a glioblastoma in a brain or a cyst in a kidney.
The life cycle principle has the following limitations,
however: at any given instant, we can only assess the hith-
erto existing ‘‘biography’’ of an object but we cannot make
any future truth assignment for individuals, since ontolog-
ical claims must be independent of the fact that we do not
know how the world turns out to be in the future.
If we take a snapshot of a protein molecule in a secreto-
ry cell immediately after biosynthesis, we still record the
relation between the two objects as permanently-located-in
according to our deﬁnition. It may even be the case that
at a given instant three indistinguishable molecules are
located in a cell. Let us consider the example of thyroid
hormone molecules in a cell of the thyroid gland. One mol-
ecule was synthesized in this cell moments before, a second
one originated from an adjacent cell, and a third one was
manufactured and ingested in form of a drug. According
to the past history of these three molecules, only the ﬁrst
one would be a part when we apply our principle in a strict
way.
4.5. Functionality
The last principle which helps us to specify under which
circumstances located-in (a, b) implies part-of (a, b) takes
into account what we call biological function and which
constitutes the principle manifestation of living structure.
Again, we take two objects a and b, with a being located-
in b. Let a have a biological function f which is essential to
the proper functioning of b. This means that b becomes
dysfunctional when f cannot be executed.
For example, the pumping function of the heart is essen-
tial to the proper functioning of the cardiovascular system,just as the function of the collection of hepatocytes is essen-
tial to the proper functioning of the liver. In contrast, the
functioning of one individual macrophage which happens
to be located-in some organ at some moment t is not essen-
tial to the functioning of the organ, nor is the function of
one given glucose molecule essential to the functioning of
a cell.
The functionality principle faces problems when applied
to parts of anatomical structures which are spatially includ-
ed into other ones but are assumed not to be essential to
the proper functioning of the latter; or whose functional
relevance has disappeared during evolution. Examples are
terminal hairs of the skin, nasal sinuses, or the appendix.
Since these entities are not essential to the proper function-
ing of the body, we cannot use the functionality principle to
specialize location to parthood in this case. Furthermore,
this principle is not applicable to granular parts, as intro-
duced by [42]. Let us consider a single hepatocyte which
is located-in the liver. Its functionality (protein synthesis,
carbohydrate and lipid metabolism, and detoxiﬁcation) is
essential to the liver. However, if one such single cell
becomes dysfunctional or dies within the normal turnover
of liver tissue components, this the functionality of the
organ is not aﬀected because there are innumerous other
cells with the same function.
When we advocate the application of the functionality
principle in order to infer parthood from location, conﬂicts
with the above sortality principle arise: transplants and
implants often fulﬁll the same essential biological function
as genetically identical structures. We could argue that the
functioning of a heart valve or kidney is essential to the
functioning of the body, therefore, it is part-of the body,
and this holds true even in cases where it was transplanted
from another body earlier.
4.6. Consequences for class-level relations
All these considerations have been made for instance-
level relations. For the purpose of practical ontology engi-
neering, we have to analyze the consequences of the above
discussion for the class-level relations Part-Of, Located-In,
and Contained-In, on the one hand, and for the related (not
inverse) relations Has-Part, Location-Of, and Contains, on
the other hand.
As far as sortality is referred to, we can transfer the same
principle to the class level relations because sortality intrin-
sically deals with classes (sorts) of individuals. Yet, this
does not solve the trade-oﬀ between the genetic and the
functionality arguments. This puzzle cannot be solved
merely by introspection into nature. Two proposals have
to be discussed: On the one hand, we could completely
refrain, in these cases, from any specialization of the loca-
tion relation. One the other hand, in these cases, we could
draw a boundary by ﬁat, which, however, depends on con-
sensus as a result of a prescriptive or normative process.
As for the life cycle principle, our argument above
allows us to infer Part-Of (A, B) from Located-In (A, B)
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principle and for which the assumption holds that every
instance of A is always located in the same instance of B.
Analogously, we can argue for Has-Part and Location-Of.
In contrast to this very strict ontological dependence
between instances, the normal class level dependence such
as expressed by the class-level relations introduced in
Section 2.2 is not suﬃcient: all (living) hearts contain
some blood cells, though not of the same ones, because
they are constantly exchanged. Therefore, we cannot
assert parthood between a heart and an individual blood
cell. The statement Has-Part (Heart, Blood Cell) can
therefore not be derived by the application of our
reﬁnement.
A diﬀerent scenario arises when we ascribe an identity
criterion to certain circumscribed amounts of matter such
as ‘‘atrial blood’’ or ‘‘the cerebrospinal ﬂuid.’’ Such entities
remain the same despite constantly gaining and losing
parts. With regard to these cases, a statement such as
Has-Part (Heart, Atrial Blood) would be correct.
Admitting or not admitting such entities is a matter of
convention. It may be made plausible when certain proper-
ties, such as volume, protein concentration, temperature,
etc., are assigned to these kinds of entities and used for clin-
ical or scientiﬁc reasoning.
The functionality principle ﬁnally shows how informa-
tion about the ‘‘standard’’ behavior (i.e., the behavior of
fully functional entities) is inﬂuenced by whether we opt
for parthood or containment. Here, again, the life cycle
argument comes into play. If we analyze two classes
and discover that permanent parthood between their
instances is not the ‘‘standard’’ situation, we have good
reasons to use the relation pair Contained-In/Contains.
This could serve to answer the thyroid hormone/thyroid
cell puzzle: the fact that thyroid hormone molecules are
located in a thyroid cell for a very limited period of their
existence only could support the argument for asserting
Contains (Thyroid Cell, Thyroid Hormone) and not using
the relation Has-Part in describing this situation.
5. Parts and occurrents
At ﬁrst sight, one may be tempted to limit the relevance
of the part-of relation to biological continuants. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no medical terminology sys-
tem which relates classes of occurrents by relations named
part-of or has-part. Only in biology is the part-of relation
between occurrents present in the Reactome curated knowl-
edge base of biological processes.2 Furthermore parts of
occurrents are indirectly addressed by formalisms for the
representation of clinical guidelines. Guidelines represent
plans which sanction classes of clinical occurrents. Such
clinical occurrent classes can be ordered by taxonomic as
well as mereological relations. For example, Gastrotomy2 http://www.reactome.org.is a subclass of the class Operation, and for every instance
of Gastrotomy there is an instance of the class Incision. We
express this by the statements Is-A (Gastrotomy, Operation)
and, just as with continuants, we use the mereological
class-level relation Has-Part for the assertion Has-Part
(Gastrotomy, Incision) [62]. A thorough analysis of parts
of occurrents reaches well beyond the scope of this paper.
We only select one problem which is relevant to the con-
struction of ontologies of biomedical occurrents and which
we have analyzed in more detail in [63].
5.1. Problem
Let us take a class of a complex procedure, e.g., the
class E = Extraction of Foreign Body from the Stomach
by Gastrotomy. Any instance of E is a complex occurrent
which is (roughly) characterized by the sequence of the
surgical opening of a stomach (i), the extraction of a for-
eign body from this stomach (ii), and the surgical closure
of the stomach (iii). We could then argue that, at the
beginning of such a (token) procedure p (e.g., during
the opening phase), an instance of the whole procedure
is created but this instance is not complete until the
whole procedure ends. It is only at the end that the
instance becomes completed. This notion of completeness
is not present for continuants, unlike for processes, as
their instances exist in totality only at one particular
instant.
In line with this argument, during a time interval i1, p is
an instance of both the class E and the class Gastrotomy. In
the subsequent phase i2, p instantiates E, again, together
with the class Extraction of Foreign Body. A rationale for
this is that a surgeon, during i1 is already performing an
instance of E.
The counterargument would be the following: one can-
not exclude that, during the ﬁrst phase of an operation,
the patient dies and the operation is aborted, p would,
therefore, never instantiate Extraction of Foreign Body
and it would be highly problematic to consider p an
instance of E. We would, therefore, require that E can only
be instantiated when all its subprocedures (which are
implied by E according to Es deﬁnition) have been
instantiated.
Either position has strong implications on ontologies of
biomedical occurrents, especially for the taxonomic
arrangement of classes. The ﬁrst approach would be
concordant with a taxonomy in which the subprocedures
feature as taxonomic parents: Is-A (E, Gastrotomy) AND
Is-A (E, Extraction of Foreign Body). The second approach
would, instead, introduce the subprocedure classes as
nodes in a partonomy. All instances of E have an instance
of Gastrotomy, as well as an instance of Extraction of For-
eign Body as parts.
Both approaches have their correlates in existing bio-
medical terminologies. Whereas the ﬁrst one corresponds
to simpler fashioned procedure classiﬁcation systems, the
latter one is at least partly paralleled by SNOMED CT [5].
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We strongly support the second approach. The main
reason is that it can be consistently applied without explicit
reference to time. The ﬁrst one, however, leads to inconsis-
tencies when time is not considered. Let us deﬁne Gastrot-
omy as an Incision which acts-on some Stomach and
Extraction of Foreign Body as Extraction which acts-on
some Foreign Body. Introducing E as a subclass of both,
we have no way to express that the stomach and not the
foreign body undergoes incision, unless we reintroduce
time (This is one reason why SNOMED CT, in these cases,
uses the idiosyncratic ‘‘role group’’ operator, cf. [63]).
In our second approach, we express the relation between
complex and component processes by a mereological struc-
ture which is not diﬀerent from the one that would be
employed for continuants. The SNOMED role group
operator would then simply be mapped to the class-level
Has-Part relation: accordingly, we would express the above
situation as Has-Part (E, Incision) AND Has-Part (E, Gas-
trotomy) AND Has-Part (E, Extraction of Foreign Body)
[63].
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the way mereological
relations are speciﬁed in biomedical ontologies is insuﬃ-
cient. In the common practice of carrying over instance-
level relations to a class-level, ambiguities inherently arise,
which, however, can be resolved by introducing clear deﬁ-
nitions. Another aspect is taking time into account, both
with regard to continuants and occurrents. Here, again,
clear deﬁnitions are helpful in order to determine what
the standard reading of part-of is and is not.
Both on the level of instances and on the level of classes
there is a fundamental diﬀerence between parthood and
(spatial) location. Whereas it is, for various reasons, rela-
tively easy to specify what is meant by a is located in b,
it is much more intricate to diﬀerentiate it from a is a part
of b or a is contained in b. This is particularly the case
when relations between changing objects and objects at dif-
ferent levels of granularity are considered. Diﬃculties also
arise when both, biological and non-biological entities, are
taken into account.
We presented a methodology that addresses at least
some issues raised. This methodology is to consider under
which circumstances the fact that a is located in b implies
that a is a part of b. We showed that taking into account
facts about relative location over time, as well as facts
about participation in biological functionalities often pro-
vides necessary and suﬃcient conditions that support valid
inferences of facts about parthood from facts about loca-
tion. Due to this reason we consider located-in as a founda-
tional relation in its own right.
This has practical implications for using ontologies as
the backbone of formal reasoning systems. There are typi-
cal reasoning patterns which exploit mereotopologicalcharacteristics of biological entities, e.g. the propagation
of properties, as extensively discussed in [40,64,65,52,21].
For these purposes, a clear distinction between parthood
and containment is fundamental.
The limitations of our approach are mostly due to vague
boundaries between kinds, controversial conceptualiza-
tions of the lives of biological objects of diﬀerent types,
conﬂicts between functionality and genetic origin, and an
imprecise understanding of biological functionality, for
which a well-founded ontological account is still required.Acknowledgments
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